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CORRESPONDENCE 
JUDGE POSNER'S JURISPRUDENCE 
OF SKEPTICISM 
Steven J. Burton* 
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism 1 is perhaps the most interesting 
philosophical account of the nature of law and the judicial process 
written by a sitting judge in many years. As a leading professor before 
assuming the bench, Richard A. Posner had developed a rich eco-
nomic theory of law.2 The coherence of Professor Posner's social-
scientific web of beliefs, 3 however, seems to have been challenged by 
recalcitrant experiences in the actual judging of cases. In particular, 
Judge Posner needs, but does not find, guidance in the law. The re-
sulting frustration leads to a sweeping philosophical skepticism about 
law, coupled uncomfortably with assurances that judicial practices are 
stable and deserve respect. 
This essay suggests that there is an instructive incompleteness in 
Judge Posner's transition from scientific observer to legal actor. His 
legal skepticism should be understood as a legacy of his days as an 
inquiring economist, observing and forming beliefs about law and the 
judicial process from the academy. His affirmation of judicial prac-
tices stems from his new respect for practical reason,4 which seems to 
result from the experience of performing judicial duties. This essay 
* Professor of Law and University Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa. - Ed. For their 
helpful comments on and criticisms of the manuscript, I thank William G. Buss, Dan Farber, 
Ken Kress, Edward H. Levi, Richard A. Posner, John Reitz, Serena Stier, and participants in the 
Duke Law School's Faculty Colloquium held on September 9, 1988. The responsibility for any 
error remains the author's. 
1. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). Subsequent refer-
ences will be bracketed in the text. 
2. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
3. The metaphor of a web of beliefs is spun out in s. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 
AND LEGAL REASONING 132-43 (1985), and in W. QUINE & J. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 
(1970). 
4. On law as practical reason in the recent literature, see, e.g., J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975); Burton, Law 
as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. (1989) (forthcoming); Farber & Frickey, Practical Rea-
son and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 24-36 (1986); Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward a11 Ade-
quate Theory. 51 u. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985). 
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will argue that a more complete assimilation of the practical perspec-
tive of the legal actor would undercut Judge Posner's arguments for 
legal skepticism. 5 
I. JUDGE POSNER'S Two PERSPECTIVES 
Judge Posner's essay relies on two very different perspectives. 
From a scientific perspective, he seriously doubts that law exists, that 
the law guides judges, and that legal reasoning is a cogent activity. 
From the practical perspective, by contrast, he affirms that most judi-
cial decisions are reasonable. As will be seen, distinguishing between 
these two points of view is an important first step toward a sound non-
skeptical understanding of the law. 
The starting point for Judge Posner's jurisprudence is in the phi-
losophy of science. He opens the essay by defining two methods of 
"exact inquiry" that are employed by the sciences as ways of acquiring 
beliefs (p. 830). One method of exact inquiry is logical deduction. It 
is used in law, according to Judge Posner, to answer easy questions. 
But it is of little interest because such questions are not often litigated 
(p. 832). The other method is empirical observation. It involves sys-
tematic empirical inquiry through experimentation leading to verifica-
tion or, at least, falsification (p. 836). Posner laments that neither 
scientific method plays a significant role in legal reasoning. Therefore, 
~'[l]egal reasoning is not a branch of exact inquiry ... although contin-
ued progress in the economic analysis of law may compel a modifica-
tion of this conclusion eventually" (pp. 858-59). 
Two kinds of legal skepticism flow from this conclusion. First, 
Posner advances a familiar epistemic skepticism: many legal questions 
are indeterminate by the methods of legal reasoning (p. 853). Answers 
to these questions turn on the "policy judgments, political preferences, 
and ethical values of the judges" (p. 828). Second, and more dis-
turbing, Posner advances a perhaps misnamed "ontological skepti-
cism": the law does not exist because it is not an observable entity (pp. 
828-29, 879-82, 891). The law is not a thing or set of concepts that 
guides judges or anyone else (pp. 881, 882). Law, therefore, is "simply 
the activity of judges" (p. 891). Attempts to discern predictable regu-
larities in judicial behavior, like the behavior of rats or comets, is 
about all that there is to talk about (pp. 879-83). 
These two skepticisms depend directly on Posner's conception of 
S. Other recent responses to legal skepticism include S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 188-93; R. 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 76-85 (1986); Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas'': Logical Positivist 
Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Calif. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1989); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986). 
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exact inquiry, which is an orthodox positivist conception of the scien-
tific ideal (pp. 830~37, 879-82). That ideal prizes the values, among 
others, of objectivity and determinacy in the formation of beliefs about 
the world. Objectivity requires scientific inquiry to restrict its concerns 
to objects of inquiry that have the capacity to lead all reasonable 
human observers to the same conclusions about those objects (pp. 832, 
834, 856, 857, 866). Judge Posner's ontological legal skepticism is a 
special case of his general doubt about the existence of entities that 
cannot be exactly observed (pp. 829, 866-71, 880-82, 891). The law 
indeed lacks the sensible existence needed to lead all observers regu-
larly to the same conclusions about it. 6 Determinacy requires a suc-
cessful scientific inquiry to produce results that can be replicated and 
that are not consistent with incompatible explanatory theories.7 Pos-
ner's epistemic skepticism follows mainly from the unavailability of 
experiments validating the truth oflegal claims (pp. 858-61). The law, 
of course, cannot be reduced (without remainder) to empirically ascer-
tainable facts (pp. 858-61).8 
Posner accordingly believes that "the methods of exact inquiry are 
rarely usable by judges deciding cases" (p. 840). Rather, judicial rea-
soning is mainly a branch of practical reason (p. 859). Posner defines 
practical reason as "the methods that people who are not credulous -
who have inquiring minds - use to form beliefs about matters that 
cannot be verified by logic or exact observation" (p. 838). In his view, 
"it includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, intu-
ition, ... empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, meta-
phor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, induction, . . . [and] 
'experience'" (p. 838). Judges resort to this grab-bag of methods 
when, as is often the case, the more reliable methods of exact inquiry 
a,re not adequate. Posner assures us that "[p]ractical reason can an-
swer most of the legal questions that logic cannot answer" (p. 840). 
Rejecting a scientific approach to judging is not surprising for a 
sitting judge, whose point of view is not that of an observer. In this 
6. This does not mean that members of a community do not regularly come to the same 
conclusions about how the law applies. Many observers have noted the amazingly high levels of 
agreement among lawyers, judges, and others about what the law permits or requires in the 
situations in which it claims to govern. E.g., sources cited in S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 96. 
Posner agrees. He defends his two skepticisms, however, by confining his attention to cases that 
come before courts because members of the legal community "are not much interested" in ques-
tions that are not litigated. Posner's sweeping skepticisms about law, however, are highly implau-
sible if one takes into account all applications of law, which might include each decision by a 
motorist to stop at a red light. That lawyers are not much interested in situations where the law 
works unproblematically is not a good reason to dismiss such situations when claiming that the 
law does not exist and cannot be known. 
7. Judge Posner appeals to the value of determinacy at 832, 853, 859, 863, 891. 
8. Burton, supra note 5, at 1147-52. 
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case, however, it is very surprising in light of this judge's famous aca-
demic history. Posner's endorsement of practical reason, understood 
to encompass both the point of view of an actor and ways of reasoning 
that differ from those of the sciences, is a new development in his 
thinking. He thus acknowledges his formerly strict logical positivism 
and, at the same time, abandons it (pp. 839, 866, 888-89, 890). He 
assures us that there are good answers to many ethical and legal ques-
tions independent of the verifiability of those answers by scientific 
means (pp. 839-40, 874, 889). And he claims that, by contrast with 
the methods of exact inquiry, including economic analysis, practical 
reason comprises "our principal set of tools for answering questions 
large and small" (pp. 838-39). These are important revisions to a for-
merly scientific web of beliefs about law. 
As will be seen, however, shifting to the practical point of view has 
implications beyond those outlined in The Jurisprudence of Skepti-
cism. Posner's skepticisms, like those expressed in some Critical Legal 
Studies,9• depend on the scientific criteria of objectivity and determi-
nacy. The undefended premise is that these orthodox scientific stan-
dards are among the necessary criteria for the existence and 
identification of the law. Posner's arguments for legal skepticism fail if 
scientific criteria do not govern law and judicial practice at all. 
II. SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL DISCOURSES 
Different intellectual discourses, or "fanguage games," define con-
ceptually different worlds of inquiry (with points of crossover in prac-
tice). Each discourse proceeds on its own assumptions, in its own 
language, guided by its own rules, and under its own standards of suc-
cess. Scientific and practical discourses are distinct in these ways. 
Law is not a science to be understood or criticized in scientific terms. 
Rather, law is a practical project to be understood and criticized in 
practical terms from the outset of the ~nquiry. Therefore, scientific 
criteria like Posner's do not govern law and judicial practice. 
Consider, for example, the familiar distinction between "analytic" 
discourses, like mathematics, and "synthetic" discourses, like the em-
pirical sciences. Ordinary mathematics proceeds in terms of number, 
equality, proof, transitivity, infinity, recursion, and the like, reflecting 
9. Posner recognizes this similarity but is intent on distinguishing his skepticism from that of 
radical skeptics in the Critical Legal Studies movement. Posner, supra note I, at 827. His claims 
that the law does not exist and cannot be known by the methods of exact inquiry, see infra notes 
12-15 and accompanying text, and his denial of the cogency of legal reasoning, do seem to be as 
sweepingly nihilistic as the strongest of skeptical claims in Critical Legal Studies. However, his 
claim that practical reason yields reasonable decisions in a wide range of cases is decidedly to the 
contrary. 
714 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:710 
the entities, relationships, and modes of existence that are recognized 
within the mathematical world. This discourse requires rigorous war-
rants for making inferences at every step, and a successful proof must 
be replicable by any competent mathematician at any time or place. 
Empirical sciences, by contrast, use a language of hypotheses, data, 
measurement, probability, statistical significance, and the like, in part 
reflecting their interest in a different set of entities, in different kinds of 
relationships, and with different modes of existence. The rules of this 
discourse require experimentation and are far more concerned with 
excluding the prejudices of the inquirer. The conceptual difference be-
tween the two discourses explains why it obviously is a mistake, for 
example, to criticize a mathematical claim for lacking empirical 
support. 
The difference between analytic and synthetic discourses (hereafter 
called "scientific discourses") is taken for granted in a culture, like 
ours, that has been heavily influenced by logical positivism and related 
modernist developments. Despite his announced break with logical 
positivism on other matters, the same distinction marks Posner's two 
branches of exact inquiry, which he calls "logic" and "empirical in-
quiry," and which undergirds his legal skepticism. I.n philosophical 
circles, however, logical positivism generally is ridiculed despite (or 
because of) its continuing influence in the wider culture. It failed as a 
philosophy of science. More important for present purposes, it failed 
to confine all legitimate knowledge to the scientific. Yet that is just 
what Posner tries to do when advancing his two skepticisms. 
As the analytic and synthetic have their respective discourses, it is 
now widely appreciated that practical matters - ethics, politics, and 
law - have a different and appropriate discourse outside of the sci-
ences altogether. Both kinds of scientific knowledge are produced 
from the human capacity to form beliefs about how things are. Ana-
lytic statements, on the other hand, express beliefs about the logical or 
mathematical worlds, in which mathematical or logical concepts have 
regular relationships that are known by analysis or calculation. Syn-
thetic statements express beliefs about the empirical world, in which 
objects and events are supposed to obey scientific laws that can be 
known and tested by observation and measurement. But we also have 
a capacity to act intentionally on reasons for action and, within limits, 
thereby to change the empirical world in which we live. This is the 
capacity for practical reason. It is not directed to the formation of 
beliefs about how things are. Rather, it concerns how things ought to 
be. 
The capacity for practical reason is the converse of that used in the 
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sciences to form beliefs. For example, the human mind makes repre-
sentations of the world, as when we say that "the cat is on the mat." 
Sometimes we say, "it is the case that the cat is on the mat," thereby 
expressing a belief. That descriptive representation is true if; indeed, 
the cat is on the mat. The representation can be changed if the cat is 
not on the mat. By contrast, we sometimes say, "it ought to be the case 
that the cat is on the mat." That prescriptive representation can be 
true whether or not the cat is on the mat.- If the cat is not on the mat, 
we can act by getting a cat and putting it on the mat! Thus, we have 
the capacities both to change our representations to bring them into 
conformity with the empirical world and, within limits, to bring the 
empirical world into conformity with our representations. 
A practical discourse is prescriptive in that it concerns how our 
world ought to be in respects that can affect the conduct of our lives. 
It has a distinctive vocabulary that (not coincidentally) tracks the nor-
mative language of the law: rights, duties, permissions, prohibitions, 
principles, responsibilities, and excuses are among the recognized con-
cepts. Its rules require claims to knowledge to be supported not by 
proof or experimentation, but by rational argument about what some-
one ought to do. Most important, valid claims to practical knowledge 
must satisfy criteria that are appropriate to a discourse directed to ac-
tion, not criteria imported from discourses directed to the passive for-
mation of beliefs. 
Among the distinctive criteria of practical knowledge are norma-
tivity, impartiality, and good judgment, not the counterpart scientific 
criteria of objectivity, neutrality, and determinacy.10 As used here, 
10. Many major moral philosophies in their most salient respects can be understood to hold 
themselves responsible to something like these criteria of practical knowledge. Aristotle's ethics, 
for example, uphold norms that are implicit in the telos of human nature, urge impartiality 
through the cultivation of the virtues, and seek practical wisdom as the manifestation of good 
judgment. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927 (R. Mc-
Keon trans. 1941). Kant's very different ethics nonetheless respond similarly to the criteria of 
normativity (the categorical imperative), impartiality (universalization), and good judgment 
(right action). I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. Paton trans. 
1958); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965). Bentham's 
distinctive ethics require normativity as the greatest good, impartiality through the pleasure prin-
ciple with everyone counting for one, and good judgment by way of consequentialist or means-
ends rationality. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970). 
More recent analytical philosophy supplies a meta-ethical dimension that also is responsive to 
the same criteria of practical knowledge. Among the main topi~ of much recent moral philoso-
phy are "ought" statements, universalizability, and normative justification on the balance of rea-
sons for action. See generally, PRACTICAL REASONING (J. Raz ed. 1978); R. HARE, THE 
LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1953); J. RAz, supra note 4; G. VON WRIGlIT, PRACTICAL REASON 
(1983). The analytical effort is compatible with Aristotelian, Kantian, and Benthamite ethics 
because it is on a third dimension in a matrix where the criteria of practical knowledge are on one 
dimension and the various substantive moral theories are on the second. 
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normativity refers to the guidance of action by standards of conduct 
that are claimed to prescribe what someone ought to do. 11 Impartial-
ity refers to the exclusion of ad hominem considerations, such as ad-
vantage to self, friends, or groups with which one identifies, from an 
assessment of reasons for action. Good judgment refers to action on 
the balance of reasons as well as possible under the circumstances, 
without certain knowledge of the rightness or goodness of what we do. 
These criteria supplant both objectivity and subjectivity, neutrality 
and bias, and determinacy and indeterminacy because they are inap-
propriate dichotomies within a practical discourse. 
In practice, of. course, scientific and practical elements are com-
bined in human endeavors. An empirical scientist takes action when 
embarking on a project, executing a research plan, publicizing the re-
sults, or incorporating the results into applications. The practice of 
science, as such, includes some of these actions as needed to pursue 
true beliefs. Conversely, the ethical. or legal actor might form beliefs 
when deciding what to do. Since no one ought to do something. that is 
impossible, beliefs about what is possible in human action are relevant 
in practical deliberations. A judge, moreover, may make findings of 
fact, identify general propositions of positive law, gauge the social con-
sequences of a decision, and at times predict what the judges of an-
other court would do. Such beliefs, however, are formed as needed to 
act properly in a case. Significantly, we can be warranted in forming 
beliefs ancillary to action on weaker evidence (e.g., a preponderance) 
than would be required when claiming scientific knowledge. 
The conceptual distinction accordingly is maintained to distin-
guish the capacities for pursuing scientific and practical goals. Keep-
ing an eye on the goal of a project helps to sort out relevant from 
irrelevant considerations. For example, a scientist who forms a pri-
vate theoretical belief that a nuclear explosion is possible should have 
appropriate reasons for the ·belief, but just by forming the belief incurs 
no important ethical obligations. The reasons for belief primarily will 
involve facts within the domain of nuclear physics. The acts of expres-
sing that belief, such as building a device and detonating it, surely do 
attract serious ethical obligations. Such acts should be supported by 
appropriate reasons for action, which will involve moral principles. 
Moreover, a judge who invalidates the death penalty on constitutional 
grounds by that act is not responsible for representing any part of the 
empirical world correctly. Her reasons for action might, however, re-
quire beliefs aboJ.It the deterrent or discriminatory effects of capital 
11. The claim, of course, need not be valid. Thus, iniquitous laws can be norms. See J. RAZ, 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAw.28-33, 153-59, 233-62 (1979); infra text accompanying notes 24-28. 
December 1988) Correspondence 717 
punishment that, in turn, depend on scientific criteria. The conceptual 
distinction between practical and scientific endeav9rs, reflected in the 
difference between prescriptive and descriptive uses of language, helps 
to disentangle what-is-a-reason-for-what and thereby aids clear under-
standing and criticism. 
For these reasons, it should not be doubted on scientific grounds, 
as Posner urges when advancing his ontological skepticism, that the 
law exists in a mode appropriate to its practical nature. Some beliefs 
themselves are more secure than any proofs which might be offered by 
philosophy or science in their defense. It seems only with reference to 
reasons for action that we can understand that (at least some) motor-
ists stop at red lights because the lights are legal reasons for stopping, 
or that a judge enters a default judgment because the defendant's dila-
toriness is a legal reason for doing so. The law exists ontologically 
insofar as there are such legal reasons for action, which are the pri-
mary entities recognized by a legal discourse. Posner's essay does not 
even consider the law as a provider of reasons for action. His starting 
point in the philosophy of science excludes such entities at the outset 
of his inquiry, guaranteeing a skeptical conclusion before the relevant 
arguments are even examined. 
Similarly, it should not be doubted on scientific grounds, as Posner 
does when advancing his epistemic skepticism, that we can have prac-
tical knowledge of the law. Scientists have the luxury of suspending 
belief- for decades or centuries - if the available evidence is inade-
quate to warrant true beliefs. They often do so pending further in-
quiry. The criteria of scientific knowledge consequently can be 
rigorous and even impractical. Legal actors, by contrast, typically 
have no option to avoid action; they must act on the best available 
alternative. The best course of action then must be judged on the bal-
ance of reasons under the circu;mstances,.whjch typically include lim-
ited time and resources for deliberation. 'J;'he law would be self-
defeating if it were not possible to act lawfully on a practical basis. 
One should no more want to mix up practical and scientific dis-
courses in legal theory. than to order a person forthwith to obey the 
law of gravity. As I have shown at length elsewhere,12 law is a practi-
cal matter. It is a form of social organization through the systematic 
institution of supreme authoritative standards of conduct. The law 
represents a possible organization of social. relations and a commit-
ment to bring it into empirical being by lawful action. Each applica-
tion of the law brings the empirical world - notably, human behavior 
12. Burton, supra note 4. 
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-into conformity with the law in some respect. Jurisprudential ques-
tions about the existence and identification of the law are questions 
about its practical role as a guide to conduct by judges and other 
persons. 
Posner thus glimpses something valuable when he emphasizes the 
importance of social vision and imagination to a judge who must act 
(pp. 829, 849-57, 863). The social vision he endorses, however, is that 
of an individual judge, to be acted on when the methods of the exact 
sciences run out, subject to minor constraints. The relevant social vi-
sion is represented by the legal standards and precedents which consti-
tute the law that judges have a duty to uphold. 13 The traffic laws, for 
example, represent a complex set of coordinated actions to be taken by 
motorists in response to various colored lights and signs with various 
shapes. To a remarkably large extent, motorists take those actions and 
thus actualize that part of the normative organization of society repre-
sented by the traffic laws. Other laws, like those prohibiting the sale or 
use of cocaine, represent a part of the normative organization of soci-
ety but are notoriously ineffective, as evidenced by the common sale 
and use of cocaine. The empirical world is brought into conformity 
with such laws, if at all, when legal sanctions are imposed on violators. 
Posner's jurisprudence of skepticism, by seeking scientific answers 
to practical questions, renders invisible the social vision represented by 
the law. Judges consequently would be freed to act on their own social 
visions. For example, in Posner's hands, the doctrine of precedent be-
comes merely a way of acquiring information when judges deliberate 
in a case (pp. 843-48). He defines precedents simply as "things that go 
before," (p. 845), recognizing only the fact and chronology of judicial 
decisions and excluding their normative significance. He thinks it only 
reasonable for anyone choosing a course of action to consult past expe-
rience, and judges are no different from anyone else in this respect. 
The "anecdotes" that are legal precedents, however, are of no greater· 
significance for a judge's decision than the track record of a brand of 
automobile is for a potential buyer's selection (pp. 844-47). 
Judge Posner in effect denies that precedents are presumed to have 
been decided correctly, that consistency or equal treatment requires 
like cases to be decided alike, and that precedents are in any important 
sense binding on judges. But he never argues against the conventional 
view that a legal precedent is an authoritative legal reason for a similar 
13. See S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 101-22. Posner sees statutory interpretation in a similar 
way, but otherwise seems generally to disconnect the judge from any duty to apply the law by 
denying that there is any such thing. See also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 198-222 (1985). 
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case to be decided in the same way - that a relevant precedent is 
binding in just the sense that it supplies (prima facie) 14 a mandatory 
reason for action by judges. Again, this practical understanding seems 
to have been excluded at the outset of Posner's inquiry when it should 
at least have been a target of his argument. 
The mistake of taking up a scientific discourse is further revealed 
by the main virtue Posner claims for his unusual understanding of pre-
cedent and his legal realism. 
Consistent with my view that precedent is more significant as informa-
tion than as authority, I predict that a careful study would show that 
judges who know more about a particular field of law are less deferential 
toward precedent than equally able (and· no more "restrained") judges 
who know less about the same field .... Th[is] hypothes[is] illustrate[s] a 
distinctive aspect of the approach to jurisprudence set forth in this arti-
cle: that it has explanatory and predictive potential. [p. 846] 
The "significance" of precedent is ambiguous as between the scientific 
and the practical. Whether judges in fact treat precedent variably is 
distinct from whether they are legally required to follow it. The for-
mer question concerns part of the empirical significance of precedent 
while the latter concerns its practical significance. The study that Pos-
ner proposes to verify his theory of precedent, of course, would be an 
empirical study. He cannot successfully contest the practical under-
standing of precedent with that bare empirical claim, no matter how 
many empirical studies support it, any more than proof that cocaine is 
sold in New York shows that selling cocaine is lawful there. 
The "distinctive aspect" of Posner's approach to jurisprudence is 
its claim to social scientific falsifiability. It is as though he supposes 
that the law exists, if at all, in a way that can be found, discovered, or 
observed, and therefore known scientifically or by rough approxima-
tion thereto. When it turns out that the law cannot be thus known, 
Posner reaches specious conclusions when he should reconsider his 
starting point. His scientific discourse - like that of many strands in 
legal realism and related modernist discourses - at the outset ex-
cludes the possibility that the law is to be understood from the per-
spective of legal actors through a practical discourse. It is not at all 
surprising for a judge to be frustrated in failing to find scientific an-
14. Posner does not see how judges can reason from a precedent at all "unless the outcome of 
the new case can be deduced from the prior case and the prior case cannot be reexamined." P. 
845. This treatment of overruling assumes that the mere logical possibility of interpretation or 
overruling deprives the precedent of any binding force in a highest court. A precedent, however, 
is binding ''prima facie" in that, all else being equal, one ought to follow it in similar cases. 
Overruling itself is an act that requires justification. The presence of such justification is suffi-
ciently unusual in American practice that overruling requires exceptional reasons to override 
stare decisis. 
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swers to practical questions; it is surprising for a judge to look for such 
answers in the first place. 
III. PRACTICAL REASON IN CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 
H.L.A. Hart's 1953 inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurispru-
dence at Oxford University15 introduced the methods of analytic phi-
losophy into jurisprudence. He thereby enhanced greatly the 
philosophical quality of the venture. Hart sought to elucidate the legal 
concepts embedded in our culture by analyzing how the members of a 
legal community use language. He highlighted a most salient feature 
of legal discourse - that it employs a vocabulary of rights, obliga-
tions, justifications, and excuses. Holmes, like Posner, had ignored 
this normative language of the law, seeking to "substitut[e] a scientific 
foundation for empty words."16 Hart thought that these uses of lan-
guage revealed a crucial feature of our concept of law - its role as a 
provider of reasons for action. 
Consider Hart's famous treatment of legal obligation17 in light of 
the distinction between scientific and practical discourses. He set up 
the gunman situation in which A orders B to hand over B's money, 
and threatens to shoot him if he does not comply. According to a 
coercive model of law, Hart suggested, legal obligation is to be found 
in the gunman situation writ large. Hart objected that we would mis-
describe that situation in saying that B had an obligation; rather, we 
would say thatB was obliged to hand over his money. The latter, Hart 
continued, "is often a statement about the beliefs and motives with 
which an action is done. . . . But the statement that someone had an 
obligation to do something is of a very different type."18 Statements of 
obligation, Hart suggested, presuppose the existence of social rules 
that provide standards of conduct, deviations from which are met with 
insistent and strong social criticism as such. The normative vocabu-
lary of the law, especially "right" and "duty," is used to draw atten-
tion to the rules, which are regarded by those who accept them as 
reasons for conforming their conduct and justifications for criticism of 
deviations by others. 19 Hart thus treated law with attention to the 
15. H.L.A. HART, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983). 
16. o.w. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 229 
(1920). 
17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961). 
18. Id. at 80-81 (emphasis in original). 
19. On social rules, see id. at 54-60. 
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practical point of view, from which legal rules guide conduct. Legal 
rules do not, by his account, predict, describe, or explain anything. 
Hart's successors, despite large and deep differences on many 
points, agree that the law is to be understood within a practical dis-
course. In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin recognizes the importance 
of both the internal point of view of the participant i~ a legal practice 
and the external point of view of a sociologist or historian. 20 Both 
perspectives in his view are essential and must embrace or take ac-
count of the other: 
The participant's point of view envelops the historian's when some claim 
oflaw depends on a matter of.historical fact: when the question whether 
segregation is illegal, for example, turns on the motives either of the 
statesmen who wrote the Constitution or of those who segregated the 
schools. . . . The historian's perspective includes the participant's more 
pervasively, because the historian cannot understand law as an argumen-
tative social practice, even enough to reject it as deceptive ... until he 
has his own sense of what counts as a good or bad argument within that 
practice. . . . This book takes up the internal, participants' point of 
view.21 
John Finnis similarly insists that the law is an object of inquiry that is 
constituted by human actions, practices, habits, dispositions, and dis-
course. It can be fully understood in his view only by understanding 
their point as conceived by participants.22 For Finnis, moreover, a 
philosophy of law requires the philosopher to take up the point of view 
of practical reasonableness to construct good law.23 
Joseph Raz has done more than anyone else to work out the ana-
lytical implications of law as practical reason. 24 Indeed, he believes 
that a "legal system can be conceived of as a system of reasons for 
action."25 Raz insists that many of his statements qua theorist, like 
many statements of the law by teachers and practitioners, are "de-
tached normative statements," or statements from the legal point of 
view.26 Such statements can be understood as we understand the 
Christian who says to his Orthodox Jewish friend, who is about to eat 
some pork fried rice unwittingly: "You ought not to eat that." This is 
20. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 11-14 (1986). 
21. Id. at 14. 
22. J. FINNIS, supra note 4, at 3. 
23. Id. at 3-18. 
24. See generally J. RAZ, supra note 4; J. RAz, supra note 11; J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980); Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 THE MONIST 295 (1985). 
25. J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM supra note 24, at 212. 
26. J. RAZ, supra note 4, at 175-77; J. RAz, supra note 11, at 155-57; see also H.L.A. HART, 
EssAYS ON BENTHAM 153-55 (1982) (discussing Raz's idea). Nonpositivists also recognize the 
importance of such legal statements. E.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 4, at 234-37; Nonet, In the 
Matter of Green v. Recht, 75 CAUF. L. REV. 363, 374 (1987). 
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a fully normative statement in that it guides conduct. The Christian, 
however, speaks from the point of view of one who accepts the laws of 
Kosher without thereby endorsing those laws as right or good. Simi-
larly, we can say that the law in South Africa requires blacks to use 
separate public facilities without thereby approving of any part of 
apartheid. The detached normative statement permits a legal theorist, 
teacher, or practitioner to say "what the law is" and treat the law as a 
practical matter without thereby endorsing it as right or good. 
Judge Posner's ontological and epistemic skeptical claims are ad-
dressed to the same philosophical issues that are treated in the stan-
dard literature - in particular, that concerning the existence of legal 
systems27 and the identification of the law.28 A serious philosophical 
argument in defense of legal skepticism must address the arguments in 
that corpus of excellent work. However, that scholarly tradition is 
wholly neglected in The Jurisprudence of Skepticism. Posner conse-
quently misses the ways in which law as practical reason contests his 
legal skepticism. · 
Judge Posner's new venture into the philosophy of law makes 
grand claims with profound implications for the law. A less charitable 
reading than mine might see skepticism about the existence and identi-
fication of the law, together with advocacy that a judge act on his own 
27. The relevant literature, which must be contested to sustain an ontological claim like Pos-
ner's, concerns the conditions of existence for legal systems. Raz explains the philosophical 
problem as follows: 
What are the criteria for the existence of a legal system? We distinguish between existing 
legal systems and those which have either ceased to exist (e.g., the Roman legal system) or 
never have existed at all (e.g., Plato's proposed law for an ideal state). Furthermore, we say 
that the French legal system exists in France but not in Belgium, and that in Palestine there 
is now a different legal system from the one which was in force 30 years ago. One of the 
objects of the theory of legal system is to furnish criteria to determine the truth or falsity of 
such statements. 
J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at l; see R. DWORKIN, supra note 
20, at 101-04; H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 107-14, 247-48; H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 
155-62; J. RAz, supra note 4, at 125-29; J. RAz, supra note 11, at 28-33; P. SOPER, A THEORY OF 
LAW 21, 55-56 (1984). On the existence of norms as such, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, 
at 54-60; J. RAz, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, at 60-69. 
28. The relevant literature, which must be contested to sustain epistemic skepticism about 
the law, concerns the identity conditions for propositions of law. As Jules Coleman points out, 
the problem of identity involves both an epistemic and a semantic dimension. Coleman, Negative 
and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140-41 (1982). In its epistemic dimension, the 
problem involves the standard which can be used to identify, validate, or discover a community's 
law. Proposed solutions to the problem include the ideas of a rule of recognition, the commands 
of a sovereign, showing legal practice in its best light as law, and the like. See, e.g., J, AUSTIN, 
THE PROVINCE OF JpRISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI· 
OUSLY 14-130, 291-368 (1978); R. DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 176-275; H.L.A. HART, supra 
note 17, at 97-107; H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 127-61; J. RAZ, supra note 11, at 37-102, 146-
62; J. RAz, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 26, passim; Lyons, Principles, Posi-
tivism and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977); Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, supra note 
24, at 295; Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977). 
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social vision, as a strategic political move to do away with the tradi-
tional "fetters that bind judges"29 in a fell swoop, clearing the decks 
for a new law based on principles of wealth maximization (p. 863). On 
this reading, Judge Posner's assurances amount to a request to trust 
him with the awesome power that our system provides to judges. Sus-
picion would be discouraged if Posner's arguments satisfied the high-
est intellectual standards. Among these is the obligation to master the 
existing literature within the relevant field, exposing one's views to ref-
utation and qualification, and responding with reasons to the argu-
ments with which one differs. Judge Posner's essay, hoytever, invites 
suspicion as well as criticism. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Posner's legal skepticism results from his mistaken starting 
point in the philosophy of science and his neglect of the main body of 
relevant philosophical literature. As that literature suggests, a scien-
tific discourse is inappropriate for understanding the nature of law and 
the judicial process. The law is not a science in that it does not de-
scribe or predict social or official behavior. Rather, the law prescribes 
conduct in order to bring into existence a possible (and preferably de-
sirable) social world. Accordingly, the nature of law and the judicial 
process are to be understood from the practical point of view in the 
terms of a practical discourse. Judge Posner's arguments for legal 
skepticism consequently miss their mark. 
29. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that 
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). 
